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Abstract
Voter registration databases maintain lists of registered
voters that are used to determine who is and is not eligible
to vote in an election. As such, accurate voter registration
databases form a cornerstone of the electoral process. In
the United States, each state maintains its own voter reg-
istration database. It is not uncommon for a voter to be-
come registered in two states, for example as a result of
moving from one state to the other or of living in one state
and working in one another.
In this paper, we report on a pilot interstate voter regis-
tration database matching project between the two states
of Oregon and Washington whose goal was to explore the
feasibility of using database matching to identify voters
registered in the two states, and to do so with as much
openness and transparency as possible. We describe
the matching algorithms used, the procedures taken with
found matches, and the resulting actions taken on actual
voter registrations. We also discuss several directions for
improving matching algorithms and procedures.
1 Introduction
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA), passed into law
in the United States in 2002, required that states imple-
ment a sweeping set of changes to election administra-
tion and voting technology. Among the more important
of these changes was a requirement that states develop
statewide voter registration files. Specifically, Section
303 of HAVA [1] mandated that each state develop “a sin-
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gle, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computer-
ized statewide voter registration list defined, maintained,
and administered at the State level that contains the name
and registration information of every legally registered
voter in the State...”
As of August 2008, information provided by the Pew
Center on the States indicates that most states have imple-
mented their statewide database [2].1 But as states have
moved to develop and implement their statewide voter
registration databases as required by HAVA, scholars and
policymakers have begun to explore how statewide voter
databases can be shared across different states, in an ef-
fort to improve the accuracy of each state’s database [7,
11]. Interstate voter registration database exchange and
matching may be of particular interest to election offi-
cials in states that have metropolitan areas that span state
borders and in situations where there is a great deal of
residential mobility between two or more states. As few
eligible citizens think about canceling their registration
status at their former place of residence when they move,
interstate matching in places with high rates of residential
mobility across state borders might help identify potential
duplicate registration records, and when dealt with appro-
priately, should result in more accurate voter registration
databases in participating states.
While the issue of interstate database exchange has re-
ceived some attention in the election administration com-
munity, we are aware of only one large-scale database
exchange project, the “Midwest States Voter Record Ex-
change” [4].2 That project, initiated in late 2005, orig-
inally involved Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska and Kansas;
it has more recently been expanded to include Min-
1Notable states that have not implemented their statewide databases
are California and New York.
2There are other interstate matching efforts, for example, involving
some exchanges in the southeast and mid-central Atlantic states. The
Midwest project is the largest and most established project that we are
currently aware of.
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nesota and South Dakota. This effort has involved annual
database exchanges. An exact character-by-character
matching algorithm is applied between the databases us-
ing each registrant’s first name, middle name, last name
and recorded date-of-birth. If a match is found between
two states for a particular registrant, that information is
passed back to administrators in the two states for resolu-
tion using each state’s existing procedures. As this point,
only limited and highly aggregated information has been
provided to researchers and the public about the Midwest
effort, and so far no detailed project analysis has been
released.
In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of an in-
terstate voter registration database matching pilot project
in Oregon and Washington. This project was initiated
in August 2008 with the cooperation of the Secretary
of State offices in both states, and involved the match-
ing of databases of active voters from the two states: the
database of just over 3.4 million Washington active vot-
ers was matched to the database of the just over 2 mil-
lion Oregon active voters. A subset of counties was se-
lected to move forward in a pilot project with voter con-
tact aimed at attempted resolution to determine whether
found matches were in fact duplicate records. In the re-
mainder of the paper, we describe two different match-
ing algorithms that were employed and their outputs. We
describe the overall end-to-end process including notifi-
cation, response rates, and actions taken as a result. We
also discuss the implications of these results for other in-
terstate data exchange programs in the future and con-
sider improvements to matching through the use of more
sophisticated techniques.
2 Oregon-Washington 2008 Pilot
Project
Oregon and Washington make an excellent case for a pi-
lot project such as this one. These two states have similar
progressive political cultures and there is a history of col-
laboration between the election officials in these states.
Oregon and Washington are also interesting for an in-
terstate matching project as their statewide voter regis-
tration systems were not developed by the same vendor,
suggesting that it is not necessary or important that states
share similar voter registration systems in order to carry
out efficient interstate data matching.3 Also, they both
have mobile populations; data from the 2007 American
Community Survey show that only about half of each
state’s population was born in that state (53.6% in Wash-
ington, ranking 40th of all states in percentage of the
current native-born state residents who were born there,
3Washington’s system was based on a Microsoft platform; Oregon
uses a system from Saber Government Solutions.
and 50.3% in Oregon, ranking 41st. See Table R0601
of [3].) Other data from the 2007 American Community
Survey paint a similar portrait; in terms of the percentage
of people aged one year and over who lived in a differ-
ent state one year ago, Oregon ranks 21st in the United
States (3.4%) while Washington ranks 24th (3.2%) (See
Table R0703 of [3]). Finally, the Portland-Vancouver-
Beaverton metropolitan statistical area, which straddles
the Oregon-Washington border, is one of the largest in
the nation, ranking 23rd, with an estimated population of
2,137,565 in 2006.
The primary objective of the Oregon-Washington pi-
lot project was to compare their state voter registration
databases, to identify potential duplicate records between
the files, and then to develop procedures for resolving
those potential duplicates. By developing and carrying
out processes and procedures for matching between Ore-
gon and Washington, the hope of pilot project participants
was that each state would in the end have a more accurate
voter registration database; more accurate databases in
both states should lead to more efficient election adminis-
tration. Because such an interstate matching project had
never been performed between these two states, the pre-
cise procedures for both stages (identification of potential
duplicates and procedures for resolution of potential du-
plicates) were developed as part of the pilot project. The
procedures developed by this pilot project may therefore
be of interest to other state election officials considering
interstate matching efforts.
The Oregon-Washington project began in early August
2008 with a series of telephone conference calls among
the project team (which consists of the authors of this
report as well as representatives from Secretary of State
offices of both Oregon and Washington as well as some
local county officials). On August 13, 2008 the Oregon
Secretary of State’s Office (OSOS) received the complete
voter registration database from the State of Washington.
At the time this pilot project was undertaken, the Ore-
gon voter database had 2,053,444 records (approximately
280MB of data), and the Washington voter database had
3,407,596 records (approximately 465MB of data), for a
total of 5,461,040 records. Notably, these files were con-
sistent in structure and content with the public voter reg-
istration data available as a matter of public record—no
additional information was contained in these files. For
this reason, any private or public entity could have en-
gaged in the matching aspect of this project.
The OSOS staff proceeded to carry out matching on the
Washington and Oregon databases. The two databases
proved to be identical in formatting and naming conven-
tions, except for a minor discrepancy between the for-
mat of the date-of-birth field.4 Following the methodol-
4Washington uses a format mm/dd/yyyy for their date-of-birth field,
while Oregon uses mm-dd-yyyy; OSOS staff converted the Washington
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ogy that has been used by the Midwest interstate match-
ing project, the first matching algorithm used by OSOS
matches on the complete first name, complete middle
name, complete last name and date-of-birth. Addi-
tionally, OSOS used a second matching algorithm that
matches on the complete first name, the first character
from the middle name field, complete last name, and the
date-of-birth.
The matching was done using FileMaker Pro, by
OSOS staff, using standard desktop machines. After the
date-of-birth fields were made comparable, the OSOS
staff merged the two databases together (creating one
large data file with approximately 5.4 million records).
Within that file, they created two new fields, one that con-
catenated full first name, full middle name, full last name,
and date-of-birth; the second concatenated the full first
name, the first character of the middle name field, full last
name, and date-of-birth. These two new concatenations
“match keys” that were then used to identify matches be-
tween the two state files.5 Merging the two files took
approximately 90 minutes on an iMac; the analysis iden-
tifying matches based on the second concatenation took
approximately 50 minutes.
We define the match rate as the number of matched
records found divided by the total number of records from
both states, expressed as a percentage. This excludes in-
state matches, which were not investigated in the pilot
project. Using the first matching algorithm, when the full
middle name was used, 3,482 matched records between
the two states were found, for a match rate of 0.064%.6
However, when only the middle initial was used in the
matching algorithm, there were 8,292 matching records
between the two states, a match rate of 0.152%. This
larger set of matches includes all of the original 3,482
matches; the use of only the middle initial added 4,810
cases to the set of identified matches. Notably, this
subtle matching difference (middle name versus middle
initial) more than doubled the number of match candi-
dates found—specifically, it resulted in 2.375 times more
match candidates. Human inspection of both matching
methods produced a great degree of confidence in that
these methods were yielding potential duplicates.
format to the Oregon format.
5The matching was not case sensitive. Although no preprocessing
was done to remove hyphens, more advanced matching methods rou-
tinely are able to deal effectively with hyphenated names. The details
of the more advanced matching methods are beyond the scope of the
current paper.
6This number means that there were 3,482 records in the Oregon
file that had exact matches with 3,482 records in the Washington file;
the total number of records across both states that were matched is thus
twice this number.
3 Analysis of Interstate Matches
Once the matching algorithms yielded lists of potential
duplicates, the next step was to determine how to pro-
ceed. The election officials involved in the pilot unani-
mously decided to use the larger set of matched records
as the starting point for this pilot project. This involved
the 8,292 duplicate records that arose from the matching
algorithm using the middle initial, for the second com-
ponent of the pilot: selection of a pilot subset, voter no-
tification and changes to the voter registration database.
Before describing how potential duplicates were handled
by the election officials, we first summarize the results of
the second matching algorithm.
Our first analysis, presented in Table 1, identifies the
counties in each state that had the most matched records.
There we give the fifteen counties with the most matched
records (rank-ordered by number of matched records);
we also give in the second column of Table 1 data on the
number of registered voters in each of these same coun-
ties to provide a better sense of the extent to which popu-
lation alone might make counties particularly susceptible
to being among the top set of counties with matches.
Not surprisingly, we see that the more populous Wash-
ington and Oregon counties had the greatest numbers of
matched records. As Table 1 shows, in Washington the
two counties with the most matched records were King
and Clark, followed by Pierce, Snohomish, and Spokane
counties. A similar pattern exists in Oregon: the coun-
ties there with the most matches are also among the more
populous Oregon Counties, including Multnomah, Wash-
ington, Clackamas, Lane and Marion counties. This anal-
ysis makes clear that the number of matches that arise due
to intrastate matching efforts in any particular county is
to some extent simply related to the county’s population.
In Table 2, we give the county combinations that we
observe in the dataset of matched records, ordered by
their frequency of occurrence. In other words, this table
presents the county combinations across the two states
that generate the highest number of matches. We see
that the populous counties again are likely to be at the
top of this list: of the 8,292 matches, 991 matches come
from Multnomah County in Oregon and King County in
Washington; 790 come from a Multnomah-Clark County
match; and 398 are due to matches between Washington
State’s King County and Oregon’s Washington County.
Furthermore, many of the counties that rank high in
numbers in the matched dataset are also counties at or
near the Oregon-Washington border, which also suggests
that some of these individuals in the matched dataset
might reside in geographic areas where there is substan-
tial cross-state mobility. This is particularly true for
a number of the county pairs that we see in Table 2:
Multnomah-Clark and Clackamas-Clark are good exam-
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Washington Total Voter Matching
County Matches Registrations %
King 2774 1108128 0.25
Clark 1765 216508 0.82
Pierce 534 411103 0.13
Snohomish 348 372636 0.09
Spokane 334 258952 0.13
Thurston 329 148527 0.22
Cowlitz 275 55331 0.50
Walla Walla 209 31625 0.66
Kitsap 197 144690 0.14
Klickitat 155 12171 1.27
Yakima 147 97856 0.15
Whatcom 132 115314 0.11
Benton 107 87059 0.12
Pacific 88 13052 0.67
Chelan 82 38650 0.21
State Total 7476 3629851 0.21
Oregon Total Voter Matching
County Matches Registrations %
Multnomah 2717 422336 0.64
Washington 1058 266523 0.40
Clackamas 876 220448 0.40
Lane 537 204976 0.26
Marion 380 147849 0.26
Deschutes 374 91681 0.41
Jackson 307 119231 0.26
Umatilla 228 31762 0.72
Benton 174 49895 0.35
Yamhill 140 50048 0.28
Clatsop 133 21503 0.62
Linn 123 61954 0.20
Columbia 119 28521 0.42
Douglas 118 64526 0.18
Polk 117 41479 0.28
State Total 7401 2113668 0.35
Table 1: Counties with Highest Numbers of Matches
Oregon Washington
County County Frequency
Multnomah King 991
Multnomah Clark 790
Washington King 398
Clackamas Clark 302
Washington Clark 244
Clackamas King 235
Lane King 234
Deschutes King 147
Multnomah Pierce 145
Marion King 135
Jackson King 123
Multnomah Thurston 111
Multnomah Spokane 106
Umatilla Walla Walla 91
Multnomah Cowlitz 82
Table 2: Top Fifteen Combinations of County Matches
ples of this phenomenon. The results in Tables 1 and 2
also demonstrate that, at least between Oregon and Wash-
ington, cross-state matches occur more frequently from
larger population counties, especially those such as Mult-
nomah that are on the border with another state.
Another question of interest involves the date of reg-
istration for the potential matches that were identified
between the two state databases. Each state database
has the date of most recent registration in that state, and
we were able to compare those registration dates in a
number of ways. First, we analyzed the difference be-
tween the registration dates for each of the 8292 matched
records, and found that the median absolute difference in
registration dates was 1538 days, or approximately 4.2
years. That implies that many of the matched cases in-
volve records where the difference in registration dates
between the states is four years or more. When we exam-
ined records where the voter registration date was most
recent in Washington (2739 cases), we found that there
was a very wide range of Oregon registration dates: in
this analysis one record had an Oregon registration date
of 1941, though most of the Oregon registration dates
were much more recent, including 603 in 2004, 329 in
2006, and 95 in 2008. The same analysis of the 5553
cases where the Oregon registration date was most recent
revealed two cases with a Washington registration date of
1944, though again most were much more recent, with
877 in 2004, 518 in 2006, and 148 in 2008.
Of particular interest are the cases where the matched
records involve registration dates in both states in 2008,
which in our analysis of the 8292 potential matches was
a total of 243 cases. Most of these cases where we see
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matched records with a 2008 registration date in both
states involve records from border counties; for example,
84 of these matched records with 2008 registration dates
in both states involve an Oregon address in Multnomah
County, while 77 involve a Washington address in Clark
County. Visual examination of the two registration dates
among all of these 243 these records often turned up reg-
istration dates that were relatively close in time: for ex-
ample, in one case we see an Oregon registration date of
April 3, 2008 and a Washington registration date of April
7, 2008, another case had an Oregon registration date of
June 19, 2008 and a Washington registration date of June
24, 2008.
4 Resolution of Matches
With the matched files in hand, the election officials from
both states involved in this pilot project made an early
decision to mitigate potential risk via a partial project
rollout—limiting the scope of the study to a subset of
the population. Voter registration list processing for du-
plicates can come with much public scrutiny. Just a few
missteps involving even a very small percentage of voters
can be raise significant concern, be easily mischaracter-
ized, and even bring an unfortunate and untimely end to
such an effort. An additional issue was that the 2008 gen-
eral election loomed just a few months away and with this
a potential for extraordinary scrutiny and concern from
media, privacy community, oversight entities and other
third parties. It is easy to imagine the initial rollout of
a project suffering missteps such as bugs in the imple-
mentation of the matching process, or notification letters
being mailed with a typographical error in the contact
phone number or inadvertently missing pre-paid postage
envelopes. Making such a mistake on a statewide scale
was deemed worth avoiding. With these risks in mind,
it was mutually agreed that a partial rollout would allow
the two participating states to ensure all of the project
elements worked as planned before proceeding further.
With this conservative approach in mind, the joint team
decided to perform the end-to-end process (matching, no-
tification, and changes to the voter rolls) on only a subset
of the total available statewide data. As a result, the pilot
project was able to remedy a process error in the mail-
ing, determine estimated response rates, and deal with
media messaging issues that had began to emerge. Us-
ing this knowledge, the potential costs and consequences
of a full statewide effort can be better estimated in terms
of resources and outcomes while at the same time consid-
erably reducing execution risk.
The scope of the pilot project with respect to deeper
analysis, notifications and procedural remedies was lim-
ited to Clackamas, Multnomah and Washington Coun-
ties in Oregon, and Clark County in Washington. These
counties are border regions between the two states, in
areas where it was believe that there was a relatively
high degree of cross-border mobility. Once the scope of
the project was limited to these counties, a list of 1,312
matched individuals limited to these counties was pro-
duced and a procedure was developed for contacting indi-
viduals on the matched list.7 Each state developed a con-
tact letter. The Oregon contact letter was sent to the 686
individuals from the matched list whose most recent reg-
istration date was in Washington; the Washington contact
letter was sent to the 626 individuals from the matched
list whose most recent registration date was in Oregon. In
each letter, the individual was asked if he or she wished
to cancel his or her registration in the other state (i.e.,
the state with the less recent registration). Examples of
these letters are provided in the Appendix. When, and
only when, an individual returned the form indicating that
he or she wished to be removed from the registration list
in the particular state, that information was recorded in
the respective state election office, and that information
was then forwarded to the appropriate county election of-
ficial for resolution according to their normal handling
procedures for removal requests (including checking the
signatures). Some of the notifications were returned un-
deliverable as addressed, and that information was also
recorded by the state election office handling the particu-
lar matched individual. It is important to stress that no
removal action was taken in cases were the signed re-
quest to be removed was not returned; no individuals
were removed from either state’s registration list unless
the signed and completed request for removal was re-
ceived.8
Data on resolution is provided in Table 3, which gives
the total number of mailings in each state, the number that
appear to have been delivered, the number that yielded re-
sponses and the response rate of those delivered, the num-
ber of cancelled voters, and the number of unresolved
responses as of April 16, 2009. Oregon mailed 686 in-
dividuals from the matched list; 650 of those mailings
appear to have been delivered (95%). Of those Oregon
letters that appear to have been delivered, 391 generated
a response from the individual, a response rate of 60% of
delivered mailings. Of the 391 responses, 379 responses
were forwarded to the appropriate county election official
7The matching analysis identified 1,336 matches in these coun-
ties, as reported in Table 2 above. Before proceeding with contacting
these individuals, election officials updated the mailing list by removing
names of people who they confirmed had notified them of their move
on their new voter registration card, which is why the number of in-
dividuals in the mailing was slightly lower than the number originally
matched.
8Thus, no individuals were removed from the registration list with-
out confirmatory information. This is an issue that we will discuss in
more detail in subsequent research. See [17] for a discussion of this
issue.
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Oregon Washington
Total mailed 686 626
Delivered 650 599
Response received 391 362
Response rate of delivered 60% 60%
Cancellations 379** 352
Unresolved responses 12 8**
**Two cancellation requests received by Washington were forwarded
to Oregon for processing and are included in the Oregon cancellation
number.
Table 3: Mailing Resolution (Data as of April 16, 2009.)
in Clackamas, Multnomah or Washington Counties and
resulted in cancelled voter registration records. Twelve
of the responses were unresolved as the registered voter
did not provide enough information for the removal pro-
cess to proceed.
The response data from Washington are quite similar.
Washington sent 626 letters to individuals, and of those
599 appear to have been delivered (96%). Of those deliv-
ered, 362 generated a response from the individual, a 60%
response rate of those delivered. 352 of the responses
resulted in a cancellation of the individual’s registration
record in Clark County, Washington. Eight responses did
not have enough information for resolution, and two of
the responses received by Washington were forwarded to
Oregon for processing (and are included in the Oregon
cancellation number).
An important issue that arises when interstate voter
registration matching is concerned is the possibility that
the individuals who have active voter registrations in each
state might be obtaining and casting ballots in each state,
potentially engaging in double voting. During the course
of the pilot project, in the midst of the mailing effort
(mid-October 2008), the election officials in each state
decided to examine the voter registration dates and last
voted dates of those individuals in the matched subsam-
ple used for the pilot project mailing effort. This study
produced 67 voter records that merited further examina-
tion by the respective county election officials. Of these
67 voter records, after further investigation the respective
county election officials determined that 12 of these indi-
viduals might have voted in both Washington and Oregon
in prior elections. However, the potential double voting
had occurred sufficiently far in the past that in was not
possible to determine whether or not double voting actu-
ally occurred because signature envelopes and other doc-
umentation were no longer available for further review.
Of the twelve under examination, six returned a form re-
questing that their voter registration record be cancelled
in one of the two states. Of the remaining six, one re-
turned a ballot to Oregon for the November 4, 2008 gen-
eral election but did not submit a ballot in Washington
(even though this individual’s most current registration
date is in Washington). At this point, there is no fur-
ther investigation going on regarding historical instances
of potential double voting; however, election officials in
both states plan to revisit the potential double voting issue
in the near future, as they plan to run this analysis again
to determine if there were any potential instances of dou-
ble voting in the November 4, 2008 general election, in
which case documentation may exist to allow for closer
investigation.
5 Discussion
During this pilot a basic matching algorithm was used:
an exact character-by-character match on name and date-
of-birth, with the only exception being that middle names
were truncated to only first initial. This truncation en-
abled a middle name of Edward to match with a middle
initial of E. The exact matching approach favors the false
negative (missing real duplicates due to very minor dis-
crepancies in the data—for example, one has a middle
initial and the other record has no middle initial).
However, there are often inconsistencies between
records in part because voter registration data is created
to a great extent via manual data entry. Manual data en-
try errors in voter registration have been documented to
be as high as 20% in some cases. Specifically, the Bren-
nan Center found that data entry error was nearly 20%
when a 15,000-record audit was performed in New York
City in 2004 [16]. However, it is not clear that such data
error entry rates are necessarily that great in other states,
in particular states like Oregon and Washington that are
in frequent contact with registered voters, especially in
situations where mail is used frequently to provide vot-
ers with election materials. Data from the 2004 general
election in Oregon, where ballots are delivered by mail
to voters, show undeliverable rates ranging from approx-
imately 2 to 8% [13].
Furthermore, individuals who wish to engage in fraud
may try to use a degree of variation/inconsistency in their
registration data (using the middle name Bob instead of
Robert, wrong middle initial, a transposition error in their
date-of-birth or SSN+4 9, etc.). As a result, the kinds of
matching algorithms we used are better suited to finding
accidental duplicate registrations rather than intentional
fraud. (We note that we are not aware of research indi-
cating that such intentional fraud on statewide voter reg-
istration lists has actually been attempted, even though
9SSN+4 refers to the last four digits of a Social Security Number.
Use of SSN+4 in voter registration is a common practice and often pre-
scribed by law to prevent unintended disclosure of full Social Security
Numbers.
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potential vulnerabilities like these have been discussed in
recent studies such as [6].)
Should this project proceed into future phases, espe-
cially should other states consider engaging in interstate
matching, use of more sophisticated matching algorithms
(e.g. [19, 8, 15]) will increase the detection of proper
matches and, if done with some caution, at the same time
limit the number of new false positives (found matches
that do not in fact represent a duplicate voter). We sug-
gest experimenting with new matching approaches start-
ing with different methods of matching character data,
as well as potentially utilizing tertiary data to improve
matching results. Because false positives are always a
concern, we recommend that a notification process simi-
lar to ours be followed. Specifically, no changes should
be made to the voter rolls unless contact with the voter
was made to confirm the match. Further, if “fuzzier”
matching techniques are used, it is advised that one apply
at minimum a similar notification process and addition-
ally consider closer human inspection of the most fuzzy
matches (e.g., comparison of the signature cards) before
even attempting to contact the voter. In future phases,
we also hope to obtain some quantitative measures of the
false positive rate, perhaps by following up by telephone
calls or other communication with a sampling of the po-
tential duplicates.
Some other potential matching improvements to con-
sider include the following:
• Name Roots. Name root libraries enable the
matching process to recognize that names within
name families such as Bob/Bobby/Robert/Rob and
Liz/Elizabeth/Beth, etc. are comparable.
• Name transliteration. Name transliteration li-
braries enable matching algorithms to recognize that
pairs such as Mohammed and Mohamed are compa-
rable.
• Name classifiers and name order evaluations.
One common data error involves name transposi-
tion such as first and last names transposed or first
and middle transposed. Errors of this nature can be
more common among names from certain cultural
groups—for example, Asian first and last names are
transposed more frequently in American usage than
names from some other cultures. Name classifiers
can help recognize, for example, that Smith and Tan
are more often last names than first names. Name or-
der evaluations are used to analyze multi-part names
for misplacement, whether the names are traditional
Western three-part names, or the many-part names
that are commonly seen in non-Western names.
• Name closeness testing. Typographical errors in
names (e.g., Donna versus Dona, Mark versus
Marek) can be detected via algorithms designed
to evaluate name closeness, such as the classic
Soundex technique [18], the more advanced Jaro-
Winkler method [14, 21], or even simply edit dis-
tance (i.e., the minimum number of substitutions,
deletions, and substitutions to get from one string to
another), which has been shown to be a reasonable
alternative to the Jaro-Winkler method [10, 9].
• Date-of-birth closeness testing. One of the more
common data errors in dates of birth occurs when the
month and day are transposed (e.g., 12/06/64 versus
06/12/64). Special field-level evaluations designed
for date-of-birth challenges help detect a variety of
“closeness” issues including transposition and sin-
gle digit error.
• Use additional fields such as SSN+4, driver’s li-
cense fields, phone number, gender, and address.
If and when such information can be shared between
states, such additional attributes can potentially be
helpful to the matching process. This might not be
possible in some states as state law may prohibit
sharing of certain information with another state.
Even if data is able to be shared, this also requires
that records being matched have the same values
(e.g., under current policy, voters may use either a
driver’s license, SSN+4, or in some states full SSN,
or if the voter has none of these, the registrar will
assign an internally generated unique number). The
use of tertiary sources such as the Department of
Motor Vehicles (DMV) and Social Security Admin-
istration databases can further improve matching ac-
curacy. For example, an error in a date-of-birth can
be detected in the voter registration record if it can
be matched to DMV on name, address, and driver’s
license number. Such detection can both improve
automated match quality and assist election office
staff in manual review and disposition.
• Use publicly available data (e.g., phone books)
and public records (e.g., property ownership).
Using these sources can improve both automated
and manual review-based matching processes. For
example, Mark Smith born 6/21/74 residing at 312
Palmyra Street might look to be a match with Mark
K. Smith born 6/21/74 residing at 312 Palmyra
Street, except that one has a middle initial and one
does not. However, if the phone book has an en-
try for Mark Thomas Smith residing at 312 Palmyra
Street, this could be interpreted to provide evidence
that in fact these are two different entities as this
indicates that Mark Smith does not have a middle
name starting with “K”. While use of external data
sources can reduce the false negatives and reduce the
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false positives and should be the subject of further
research, such matching techniques are beyond the
scope of this paper. More about the value and chal-
lenges of using third party data can be found in [11].
• Automated signature analysis. To date signature
analysis comparing voter registration cards is gen-
erally a manual, human process. One method al-
ready being used by some banks to compare signa-
tures on financial instruments (e.g., checks) involves
automated signature analysis (e.g., [5]). While ef-
ficacy of these emerging technologies may or may
not meet the expectations necessary for voter reg-
istration processes, it is conceivable that eventually
such technology will be helpful to the voter registra-
tion matching process. Of course, matching on the
basis of digitized signatures requires that both state
databases have a digitized signature; in some imple-
mentations, such as “bottom-up” implementations
of statewide voter registration databases, a digitized
signature might not be available in the statewide file.
6 Results of Enhanced Matching
As a way to study some of these potential matching im-
provements, we examined some methods that go beyond
an exact character-by-character match on the entire Ore-
gon and Washington data files, which we report on here.
We note that these exploratory matching results have not
yet been followed up with further review (such as system-
atic human review and/or any voter contact).
In these experiments, we looked at methods that are
more resilient to minor typographical errors. Our strat-
egy uses three enhancements in the literature [12, 20]).
First, we bring together pairs of records using a subset
of the information (referred to as blocking). Second, we
allow very minor typographical errors in first name and
last name, as well as very slight deviations in the year-
of-birth. Third, we apply a relative weighting strategy
that assigns slightly different distinguishing power to first
name, middle initial, last name, and the components of
date-of-birth. Typically, first name and last name have
more distinguishing power than other fields.
We performed three matching passes of the two files.
The first pass brings together pairs of records that agree
exactly on date-of-birth and first character of the surname
and computes a matching score based on first name, mid-
dle initial, and last name. We use a string comparator
function that allows us to account for very minor ty-
pographical error (Smith versus Smoth). In the second
pass, we bring together pairs using month-of-birth, day-
of-birth, and first three characters of last name and com-
pute a matching score based on first name, middle initial,
Pass Total Pairs Pairs Above
Identified Cutoff
1 18,367,051 10,175
2 45,899,938 1,713
3 129,418,435 35,391
Table 4: Pairs Found in Three Passes
last name, and year-of-birth. We again use the string com-
parator for first and last name. We also use a function that
allows slight deviation in the year-of-birth. In the third
pass, we bring together pairs using the first three char-
acters of first name and the first three characters of last
name and compute a score using the remainder of first
name, the remainder of last name, middle initial, day-
of-birth, month-of-birth, and year-of-birth. We again al-
low a slight deviation in year-of-birth. Next, we slightly
modify the relative score weights of different fields and
choose a cutoff score above which we keep pairs that will
be flagged for further review. Pairs with a score below
the cutoff are considered non-matches. The intent of the
relative weights and cutoff score is to keep pairs that look
very much like those obtained during exact character-by-
character matching but might have minor typographical
error or missing data, without keeping too many pairs that
are not reasonable duplicate candidates. In this case, we
used manual review and expert “eye-balling” to choose
weights and a cutoff score, but one could investigate the
use of more analytic methods.
Table 4 shows the number of pairs and the number of
pairs above cutoffs found on each pass. Of approximately
194 million pairs, approximately 47,300 pairs are above
the cutoffs and suitable for followup. The latter number
includes the approximately 8,300 pairs that agree exactly
on all the fields. We note that it is not possible to compare
the effectiveness of different algorithms without further
knowledge about false positives (how many flagged pairs
are in fact not duplicates) and false negatives (how many
duplicate records are not flagged), as well as the cost and
risk of each kind of error. Procedures such as never re-
moving a voter without the voter’s explicit request to do
so can reduce the risk of false positives, but other factors
such as cost of mailings and risk of voter confusion must
also be considered.
7 Conclusion
The Oregon-Washington interstate voter registration
database matching project was a fruitful exercise. First,
it gave election officials in both states hands-on expe-
rience with voter registration database matching with a
neighboring state. Second, it gave county election of-
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ficials in the four counties included in the pilot project
an opportunity to clean portions of their voter registra-
tion lists immediately prior to the November 4, 2008
general election. Third, the pilot project allowed for in-
vestigation of potential double voting in the past (and
found only a very small handful of instances of poten-
tial double voting, none of which has been confirmed
to be actual double voting at this time), as well as set-
ting the stage for further investigation of double voting
in the just-conducted general election. Fourth, because
the election officials in both states wished for this pilot
project to be conducted in an open and transparent fash-
ion, they allowed the authors—as independent and neu-
tral evaluators—access to the communications between
election officials in each state as well as access to data
generated by the pilot project.10 By starting with a rela-
tively small pilot project, much was learned about the two
state’s voter registration databases, and also about the po-
tential gains from undertaking a more ambitious project.
Finally, it was demonstrated that an interstate matching
project can be carried out with relative ease despite the
fact the voter registration systems were developed by dif-
ferent vendors.
Based on our experiences in this project, we provide
several recommendations, some of which are specific to
future Oregon-Washington matching efforts, and some of
this apply to any attempt at interstate matching. First,
regarding the specific of the Oregon-Washington inter-
state data matching efforts, both states should work to
contact and resolve all matches between the two states
before the next federal election in 2010. Second, elec-
tion officials in both states should develop a set of proce-
dures to deal with undeliverable mailings; at the time of
this writing, those in the matched set (multiple interstate
registrations) whose mail notifications were returned by
the postal service have not been followed up. Such
procedures might include, for example, another mailing
to them, checking their address information against the
USPS National Change Of Address (NCOA) database,
examination of their voter registration records to deter-
mine if there are errors in data entry, or other procedural
actions. Third, both states should develop an appropri-
ate mechanism and related procedures to detect and in-
vestigate possible double voting, for example by includ-
ing voting history in the matching process. Fourth, this
project should be extended to involve other neighboring
states, perhaps Idaho and California, in future matching
10This openness and transparency was firstly generated by the com-
mitment provided by the election officials in both states to allowing us to
participate in their periodic telephone conference calls about the project,
by providing us with access to all of the relevant data and other materials
they generated during this pilot project, and through their commitment
to answer all of our questions about the project. We believe that this was
a very successful model for how independent researchers and election
officials can collaborate on pilot projects like these.
pilot projects (perhaps focusing initially on border coun-
ties, counties that are known to have high intercounty mo-
bility rates, or counties that have large number of matched
cases). Fifth, states that in the future engage in match-
ing projects should consider the use of matching methods
more advanced than exact matching, including some of
the advanced methods we discussed in this paper. Finally,
it is imperative that future projects use the same high de-
gree of transparency and open process that characterized
this pilot project so that the research community and the
public can understand exactly what the interstate voter
registration matching process involves, how matches are
resolved, and related policy and technical issues.
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Appendix A: Examples of Contact Letters 
 
       11 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF 
STATE 
BILL BRADBURY 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
 
 
 ELECTIONS DIVISION 
JOHN LINDBACK 
DIRECTOR 
255 CAPITOL ST NE, SUITE 501 
SALEM, OREGON 97310 
ELECTIONS  (503) 986-1518 
FAX (503) 373-7414 
October 1, 2008 
Dear Registered Voter: 
A routine check of our state voter list and the state of Washington’s voter list has indicated that you may 
be registered to vote in two different states. Your most recent date of registration is in the state of 
Washington however, the other voter registration address is located in Oregon. That address may be a 
previous residence for you, or it might be that of another properly registered voter.  This may also be a 
result of a clerical error. 
If you are certain that you have never registered to vote in Oregon, you do not need to do anything and 
may disregard this notice. However, because there is a state law that prohibits intentionally maintaining 
voter registrations in two locations simultaneously, you may voluntarily cancel any past registration you 
may have had in Oregon. To do so, please complete the section at the bottom of this letter and return it in 
the enclosed postage paid envelope. 
If you are not sure or would like more information, please feel free to contact our office at (503) 986-1518 
or email us at elections.sos@state.or.us. 
Sincerely, 
 
 
David Franks 
HAVA Manager 
 
Please cancel any invalid voter registration listed under my name at: 
 
_______________________________________________ ______________________ ___________ 
(Previous Residence address)    (Previous Residence City)  (Zip Code) 
 
__________________________  __________________________ ___________________________ 
(First Name)    (Middle Name)   (Last Name) 
 
___________________________________________________   ___________________ 
(Signature)         (Date) 
 
Note: The signature you submit on this form will be compared to the signature on the your most recent 
registration card submitted in Oregon. This safeguard is necessary to ensure that this information submitted is 
from the elector.  Thank you. 
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          October 8, 2008 
 
Dear Registered Voter, 
 
A routine check of our state voter list and the state of Oregon’s voter list has indicated that you may be registered to 
vote in two different states.  Your most recent date of registration appears to be in the state of Oregon.  That address 
may be a previous residence for you, or it might be that of another properly registered voter.  It might even have 
resulted from a clerical error. 
 
If you are certain that you have never registered to vote in Washington, you do not need to do anything and may 
disregard this notice.   If, however, you think you may have an old voter registration record in Washington State, I 
encourage you to voluntarily cancel that voter registration by completing the bottom section of this letter and 
returning it in the enclosed, postage-paid envelope.    
 
If you are not sure or would like more information, please contact Dave Motz, Voter Services Manager, by calling 
(360) 725-5786 or by email (dmotz@secstate.wa.gov). 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Voter Registration Services 
Elections Division, Office of the Washington State Secretary of State 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
    
Please cancel any invalid voter registration listed under my name at: 
 
____________________________________    ____________________    __________ 
(Previous Washington residence address)           (Previous WA city)    (ZIP Code) 
 
 
_____________________  __________________  ___________________ 
(First name)    (Middle name)        (Last name) 
 
 
________________________________________    ________________ 
(Signature)         (Today’s Date) 
 
Note: The signature you submit on this form will be compared to the signature on the registration record 
in question before it is cancelled.  The same safeguards created for voter registration applications bearing 
voters’ signatures will be used when processing this form.   
 
520 Union Avenue 
PO Box 40229 
Olympia, WA  98504-0229 
Tel: 360.902.4180 
Fax 360.664.4619 
www.secstate.wa.gov 
